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Abstract  
Border arrangements are often critical to the successful negotiation of peace settlements and 
the broader politics of post-conflict societies. However, developing an understanding of 
popular preferences about these arrangements is difficult using traditional surveys. To 
address this problem, we use a conjoint survey experiment to assess preferences about post-
Brexit border arrangements in Northern Ireland. We map areas of convergence and 
divergence in the preferences about post-Brexit border arrangements of unionist and 
nationalist communities, simulate the degree of public support for politically plausible 
outcomes and identify the border arrangements that both communities can agree upon. In so 
doing, we outline an empirical approach to understanding public preferences about border 
arrangements that can be used to understand the degree of support for similar institutional 
arrangements in other divided societies.  
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Border arrangements are among some of the most publicly recognised institutions in 
contemporary societies, governing both international relations and domestic politics 
(Simmons 2005, Diener & Hagen 2012).  They are an essential component to the resolution 
of inter and intra state conflicts (Holsti 1991, Hensel 2001, Schultz 2015) and often define 
coexistence of different communities in divided societies (Cederman, Ruegger Schvitiz, 
2019).  Yet, public preferences about border arrangements are rarely gauged. Even peace 
polls on territorial conflicts rarely focus on border issues (see for example Irwin 2004, 
Shamir and Shamir 1995, Kaymak, Lordos & Tocci 2008). This is not only a gap in the 
academic literature, but more importantly for the context we consider here, a key missing 
element of information for policy makers and post-conflict negotiators. Elites may end up 
negotiating with each other in relative isolation from public opinion and it can be difficult for 
politicians to gauge the level of popular support for different peace or border settlement 
options (Lederach 1997). The failures to ensure that there is popular support for agreements 
can lead to the rejection of peace settlements by referendums as demonstrated in Colombia 
(2016) and Cyprus (2004) while public endorsement of settlements can help secure their 
stability (McGarry & O'Leary 2009, Guelke 1999, Darby & Mac Ginty 2002). Because 
settling territorial disputes is crucial to peaceful interstate and intrastate relations (Owsiak, 
2012) a fuller understanding of the preferences of affected communities is central to 
negotiating viable peace solutions.  
Borders function as political institutions filtering and controlling the entry and exit of 
people and goods between territorially defined jurisdictions (Simmons 2005, Simmons and 
Kenwick 2019).  As is the case with all political institutions we can identify a range of 
dimensions along which they vary in way that shape their effects on inter-state relations, 
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trade, security and cultural identity (Simmons and Kenwick 2019). For example, border 
institutions differ in intrusiveness of their inspections, location of check points, financial 
costs they impose on users and the legal jurisdiction into which they fall which can 
encompass financial and security issues.   
Public opinion concerning these differences in border arrangements cannot be 
captured accurately by standard single item survey questions, which fail to identify the 
complexity of views about these institutions.  In evaluating border provisions, respondents 
must consider the qualities of one border attribute traded-off against another attribute.  For 
example, decreasing the costs of crossing the border by reducing border checks, may increase 
security concerns.  In order to develop an accurate understanding of how citizens view border 
arrangements we must grasp how they make these trade-offs. 
 The methodological innovation that we propose in this paper is to apply 
conjoint analysis to identify citizen preferences about borders. Conjoint analysis has been 
applied to a range of questions of interest to political scientists including preferences about 
the attributes of political candidates (Teele et al, 2018 ), immigration (Hainmuller and 
Hopkins, 2015), welfare policy regimes (Hausermann et al,  2019) and peace settlements 
(Tellez 2019, Morgan-Jones, et al 2019) among others. In conjoint analysis, respondents rank 
or rate two or more hypothetical choices with multiple attributes; the objective is to estimate 
the influence of each attribute on respondents’ choices or ratings (Hainmuller et al. 2014). 
The values of different attributes are randomised across respondents enabling strong causal 
inferences to be drawn. This proves particularly useful in mapping  community-based 
preferences in divided societies, where  it enables explaining differences and exploring 
solutions acceptable to all sides . Using this approach we offer a deeper understanding of how 
inter-community preferences diverge and how they could converge in a jointly supported 
solution.  
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Brexit and the Border  
Northern Ireland represents an ideal case to examine border issues in a divided society as the 
border is central to the politics of the peace process and has been a salient aspect in the 
politics of Northern Ireland since the early 1900s (Rankin 2007). The partition of Ireland in 
1920 split the island into two political units: the Irish Free State which chose to leave the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland which remained part of it. On the one hand, Irish 
nationalists who wanted  a united Ireland became a minority in a region of the United 
Kingdom dominated by unionists. Unionists, on the other hand, were committed to remaining 
part of the United Kingdom and feared becoming a minority if Ireland were to re-unite. Thus, 
the imposition of the border was central to the definition of the political identities of both 
communities (Coakley 2017).  
The location of the border and arrangements for controlling it were contested for the 
rest of the twentieth century and were important to the violent conflict that emerged in the 
1960s. Following the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998 the importance 
of the border in the politics of the region was reduced. The Agreement reduced violent 
conflict and established power-sharing provisions bringing stability. In addition, the 
integration of the UK into the European Union’s (hereafter EU) common regulatory 
framework saw the reduction of border infrastructure and an increasingly free flow of goods 
and people. During the past 20 years, the border has become invisible, and this has facilitated 
trade, with cross border trade accounting for 61% of the total volume of exchanges between 
Northern Ireland and the EU. A further effect of EU integration has been to increase the 
security of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, as they perceive their rights as 
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more securely protected under EU law and guaranteed their free movement across the border  
(Guelke 2017).  
 The UK vote to leave the EU in 2016 sharply increased the importance of the border 
and reawakened concerns about the stability of the peace process (Phinnemore & Hayward 
2017; Guelke 2017). This was compounded by three further conditions placing extra pressure 
on the border settlement. Firstly, during the Brexit referendum campaign, the main unionist 
and nationalist parties took opposing positions. The largest unionist party, the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), campaigned for the UK to leave the EU, whilst Sinn Fein, the largest 
nationalist party, wanted it to remain (McCann & Hainsworth 2017). Secondly, the UK’s 
2017 Westminster General Election resulted in a Theresa May led conservative minority 
administration supported by the DUP. This meant the UK government was dependent on one 
of the region’s parties to sustain itself in office. Thirdly, the UK withdrawing from the EU’s 
single market and customs union, strengthen the practical  implications of the fact that the 
Northern Irish land border would now be a EU external border. This could result in the need 
for extensive border checks to establish that goods and people moving from one jurisdiction 
to another meet the relevant regulations (Hayward, Campbell & Murphy 2017). This 
possibility dramatically increased the political significance of the border given the 
requirement for the UK government to negotiate a withdrawal agreement with the EU in 
order to provide for an orderly exit.   
 From December 2017 until January 2020 the UK parliament was deadlocked and 
unable to approve the Withdrawal Agreement that Theresa May’s government had negotiated 
with the EU. At the time of data collection in May and June 2018  no withdrawal agreement 
outlining the status of Northern Ireland had been ratified by the UK Parliament.  Only after 
the Westminster general election of December 2019, when Boris Johnson’s Conservative 
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government secured a substantial majority to ratify in parliament  a renegotiated Withdrawal 
Agreement Bill in January 2020.1   
Despite the salience of the border issue in the politics of Northern Ireland and these 
negotiations, little attention has been paid to the preferences of residents of the region with 
the exception of Garry et al. 2018. In particular, no one has gauged citizen preferences 
surrounding the trade-offs inherent in possible changes to border institutions. More open 
borders might smooth the economic transaction costs of crossing borders but raise security 
concerns. Harder to cross borders might provide more practical and symbolic support of 
security and identity concerns but entail higher transaction costs.  This is exactly the kind of 
trade-off Northern Ireland is now facing as it evaluates the consequences of Brexit. To what 
extent should borders between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and/or Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain be regulated? Should Northern Ireland maintain close contact with 
the Republic of Ireland and the EU at the risk of more legal distance from the rest of the UK? 
Complicating this issue is the fact that the relative anticipated cost of Brexit to the Northern 
Irish economy is high. The UK government  estimates that between eight to twelve percent of 
the Northern Irish GDP could be lost depending on the precise Brexit outcome (Hughes & 
Hayward 2018). Would compensation for these losses shape views on acceptable border 
arrangements?   
To explore how public opinion in the region evaluates these characteristics of border 
regulation, we analyse the results of a survey experiment administered to Northern Irish 
citizens in May and June 2018. 
 
 
 
1
 Though even then some confusion remained about the precise implications for border 
infrastructure of the Northern Irish see Curtis (2020).  
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Experimental Design and Analysis  
We gathered a sample of 759 respondents (age 18+)2 from the Qualtrics Northern 
Irish Online Panel  comprising  the unionist and nationalist communities, as well as citizens 
who did not identify with either group3. Respondents were presented with pairs of 
hypothetical border agreements and asked to choose one. Each agreement had five attributes4 
mirroring the key dimensions of the future border arrangements to be agreed:  
• Location of border stations 
• Characteristics of border checks 
• Monitoring of border crossings 
• Responsibility for the costs of maintaining border infrastructure 
• Compensation for changes to border arrangements 
 
Each attribute had between two and five values, proposing alternative solutions. Table 
1 reports the list of dimensions and corresponding values, and Figure 1 shows an example of 
paired choices. Overall, respondents saw four pairs of border settlements in separate screens 
and were asked to make a choice between the two options in each pair, for a total of eight 
potential agreements evaluated by each individual5.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sample pair of border agreements 
 
2
 The response rate for the web sample was 0.264, calculated as per AAPOR guidelines. After pilot testing the 
survey experiment on 80 subjects we established a minimum cutoff point of four minutes. Any entry produced 
in less than four minutes was excluded from the sample and recruitment continued until all entries were above 
the cut-off.  
3 We limit the analysis presented here to Unionists and Nationalists, respectively 331 and 242 individuals for a 
total of 573. Estimates for non-identifiers, who either indicated that they identified with neither community 
(146) or preferred not to say (40) can be found [reference omitted] 
4
 The order of attributes was randomised for each respondent, as were the values. 
5
 The full questionnaire is available in the on-line supplementary material upon request.  
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Table 1. Northern Irish border dimensions and values  
 
Location of Border 
Stations 
At ports of exit from the island of Ireland 
 
At ports of entry to England, Wales and Scotland 
 
At the land border between Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland 
Characteristics of 
Physical Border Checks 
Border officers physically examine all goods and customs paperwork crossing 
border 
 
Pre-departure electronic customs registration of all goods crossing the border 
combined with remote electronic monitoring of vehicles crossing the border and 
random physical checks of goods at depots away from border 
 
Random physical checks of goods at depots away from border 
 
Pre-departure electronic customs registration of all goods crossing border 
combined with remote electronic monitoring of vehicles crossing border 
 
No checks on goods crossing border 
Control of Border 
Crossings 
Separate control and operation of border crossings by RoI and UK governments 
with both sides working on their own 
 
Shared control and operation of border crossings by RoI and UK governments 
including mixed UK/RoI teams on both sides of the border working together 
Responsible for costs of 
maintaining border 
infrastructure 
Mainly UK government 
 
Business and individuals using the border 
 
Mainly government of Irish Republic 
 
Shared by governments of UK and Republic of Ireland 
Compensation for 
changes to border 
arrangements 
None 
 
Public spending in Northern Ireland increased by 5% 
 
Public Spending in Northern Ireland increased 10% 
 
The primary outcome of interest is the binary variable ‘border arrangement preferred’. 
This takes the value of 1 when respondents select the settlement and 0 otherwise. We 
estimate the marginal effects of the attributes’ values – coded as dummy variables - using a 
linear probability model following Hainmueller et al. (2014). We cluster the estimates’ 
standard errors by respondent to account for intra-subject correlation in Stata 15.  
 As we are primarily concerned with how preferences on border arrangements diverge 
or converge across communities, we present comparative results for unionists (331 
individuals) and nationalists (242 individuals) in Figure 2. The figure gives clear evidence 
that location of the border is strongly defined by community identification. Across this 
particular dimension, preferences of nationalist and unionists are unsurprisingly divergent. 
Nationalists are strongly opposed to a Land Border, but indifferent to where a potential 
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East/West border would be. Unionists strongly prefer a Land Border between the Northern 
and Southern part of the island of Ireland (North/South border) over an East/West border 
separating Northern Ireland from Great Britain. Preferences about whether the border should 
be at ports of entry to the UK or ports of exit from the Republic are insignificantly different 
from each other.  
Turning to border checks, we find that both communities rank physical checks lowest, 
suggesting a strong preference for non-intrusive and time-saving forms of control. 
Nationalists prefer no checks over any physical or digital form of border control. Unionists 
are slightly more open to some form of checks but generally favour the least intrusive option: 
digital registration. 
The two communities prefer shared over separate control. When it comes to paying 
for the maintenance of the border infrastructure, the preferences of unionists are aligned with 
those of nationalists and both are insignificantly different from the baseline category. As for 
compensation, nationalists think an increase in public spending is preferable to no 
compensation whatsoever, whilst unionists prefer compensation only in the order of a 10% 
increase in public spending.  
All in all, the border location emerges as equally important to both communities and 
as the main source of divergence. Unionists are 15% more likely to support an arrangement 
with a land border while nationalists are 15% more likely to reject such a scenario. However, 
nationalists display an even stronger likelihood of supporting an agreement with no checks 
(20%) compared to physical checks. This dimension is highly salient to unionists as well: 
compared to physical checks, provisions for electronic registration only increase support for 
an agreement containing such a feature at 12%.  
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Figure 2. Effect of border arrangements on Northern Irish respondents by community 
 
 
In the Appendix, we report our robustness tests, including our models controlling for 
socio-demographic characteristics and sample weighting.  
 
Simulation of Alternative Border Arrangements  
The picture presented above is one of relative agreement across the two communities along 
multiple dimensions. In other words, there is scope for bilateral support for a solution, despite 
the expected cross-community divergence on where the border should be located. To identify 
what solutions would secure support – overall and by community - we simulate different 
combinations of border arrangements and estimate the support they would get by community 
and overall. In Table 2, we present the results of simulations of a range of potential 
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arrangements that might be considered politically realistic. This gives us a feel for the 
practical consequences and the level of popular support when border attributes are varied.  
Simulation 1 explores the likelihood of support for a No Deal scenario in the event 
that a withdrawal agreement between the European Union and the UK could not be reached 
by January 31, 2020. In such a case, the border will be North-South, with the most intrusive 
form of checks (physical) control, operated separately and the UK responsible for 
maintaining the border. This is the least preferred option overall (only 42% support) and by 
community (unionists 51%, nationalists 28%). Whilst low popularity among nationalists is to 
be expected, a predicted support of merely 51% among unionists suggests that a No Deal 
outcome will not satisfy the majority of the unionist community either. Simulation 2 explores 
the North-South border with less intrusive checks (electronic only), shared control and 
maintenance of the border and no compensation. This is supported by 53% of all citizens, but 
there is a dramatic community split: it receives more unionist support (65%) but persuades 
less than half of the nationalists (40%). Both solutions would therefore pose challenges to the 
peace process, as their legitimacy among nationalists would be weak.  
Simulation 3 is an East-West border, with checks performed at ports of entry to 
mainland UK. Here, checks are electronic only; there is shared control and maintenance of 
the border and no compensation. Under this scenario, nationalists would be more satisfied 
than unionists – as there would be no barriers between the North and South of the island of 
Ireland – but the confidence intervals around the estimates of both communities fall below 
the 50% line, indicating that such a solution may not fully satisfy either or both communities.  
Simulation 4 revises this scenario with the addition of compensation (+10% increase 
in public spending). This boosts the support for this type of arrangement, with a steep 
increase (+12%) in the likelihood of nationalists supporting it. Unionists would also welcome 
an increase in public spending and would be 14% more likely to support this arrangement if 
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the increment were part of the package. The overall support of this scenario is 64%, 
indicating that including an increased public spending provision would be beneficial to 
reaching a shared solution. The provision of a combination of electronic and random physical 
checks (preferred by unionists), together with an increase in public spending in the region 
moves the lower confidence intervals of all the estimates safely above the 50% bar for each 
community as well as overall.  
These simulations show the scope to design border options that will secure societal 
agreement and attract the overall support of both groups. Crucially, a No Deal arrangement 
would be very unpopular with the whole of the Northern Irish public and is likely to 
undermine the legitimacy of the border.  
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Table 2. Simulations of support for border arrangements  
 1 2 3 4 
 
No deal North South, 
mild checks 
East-West 
mild checks 
East-West 
Intrusive checks & 
compensation 
LOCATION Land border Land border Entry Entry 
CHECKS Physical Electronic 
only  
Electronic 
only 
Electronic+ 
physical random 
CONTROL Separate Mixed Mixed Mixed 
MAINTAIN  UK Shared Shared Shared 
COMPENSATION  none none none 10% 
    
 
OVERALL 
SUPPORT  
42% 
[37%-46%] 
53% 
[49%-58%] 
54% 
[50%-59%] 
65% 
[60%-69%] 
UNIONISTS  51% 
[44%-58%] 
65% 
[58%-72%] 
50% 
[43%-57%] 
64% 
[57%-70%] 
NATIONALISTS 28% 
[21%-36%] 
40% 
[32%-48%] 
55% 
[46%-63%] 
67% 
[59%-74%] 
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Conclusion  
This study of Northern Ireland is the first to apply conjoint analysis to the 
question of citizens preferences about territorial borders. In comparison, to traditional 
surveys, conjoint analysis provides respondents with a realistic decision-making 
environment that enables them to make choices across packages of options. It offers 
the analyst simple and concise visual maps of public support for the components and 
packages being discussed. 6  With its application, we identify a number of elements 
relevant to the work of public representative, civil servants and negotiators. Firstly, 
preferences of unionist and nationalist citizens for post Brexit border arrangement 
were much more convergent than was apparent at the political party elite and 
governmental level during negotiations.  Secondly, Northern Irish citizens are very 
concerned about keeping the economic cost of crossing the border low. Therefore,  
both unionists and nationalists are prepared to compromise on solutions  with low 
border crossing costs. Third, this study has repercussions on the current post Brexit 
border arrangements, that is likely to be similarly granular and contextual in nature. 
Public support will depend on how an East West border in the Irish Sea is mitigated in 
practice – and future research can explore how preferences change in response to the 
experience of these arrangements.  
This case study of Northern Irish citizens’ preferences about border 
arrangements demonstrates the usefulness of conjoint analysis to study public opinion 
in similarly divided societies. By pinpointing the relative importance of different 
elements of potential settlements, it enables identifying solutions that can mitigate 
disagreements over individual policy issues and ease reaching solutions. Securing 
 
6
 It is possible for instance to create a toolkit that allows policymakers to rework themselves conjoint survey data 
to create Northern Ireland -Brexit scenarios. Such toolkit will automatically rework the results of existing surveys 
to produce concise visual maps of cross-community preferences based on packages selected by users themselves  
  16
cross community support is vital to any form of settlement in post conflict society. 
This study shows how conjoint experiments provide rich insights into which solutions  
are likely to secure such support.  
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Appendix 
Below we report: 
• Full model estimates in Table 1A below. Table 1A reports the estimates for 331 
Unionists with a total N of 2648 (331*8) and 242 Nationalists with a total N of 1936 
(242*8).  
• Estimates for weighted versus unweighted samples in Figure 1A. 
• Estimates – by community – with controls for gender, education and income in 
Figures 2A and 3A show.  
• Estimates of a multiplicative model by community Table 2A 
• Distribution of sample unweighted and weighted  by community Table 3A  
 
Table 1A. Full estimates for the models reported in Figure 2 
 (1) (2) 
 Unionists Nationalists 
   
   
Ports of exit from Republic of Ireland   0.05** -0.04 
 (0.01 - 0.10) (-0.09 - 0.01) 
Location: Land Border 0.15*** -0.15*** 
 (0.10 - 0.20) (-0.21 - -0.09) 
Checks: Electronic and Random Physical 0.09*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03 - 0.15) (0.03 - 0.19) 
Checks: Random Physical at depots 0.08*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02 - 0.14) (0.04 - 0.18) 
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Checks: Electronic Registration  0.13*** 0.16*** 
 (0.07 - 0.19) (0.08 - 0.23) 
Checks: No Checks  0.09*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02 - 0.15) (0.12 - 0.27) 
Control: Shared 0.03 0.07*** 
 (-0.01 - 0.07) (0.02 - 0.11) 
Maintenance: Users -0.00 0.00 
 (-0.06 - 0.05) (-0.06 - 0.07) 
Maintenance: Ireland -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (-0.15 - -0.04) (-0.16 - -0.03) 
Maintenance: Shared  0.08*** 0.07** 
 (0.02 - 0.13) (0.01 - 0.14) 
Compensation: +5% -0.01 0.05* 
 (-0.06 - 0.04) (-0.01 - 0.10) 
Compensation: +10% 0.05** 0.11*** 
 (0.00 - 0.11) (0.05 - 0.17) 
Constant 0.33*** 0.36*** 
 (0.27 - 0.40) (0.29 - 0.44) 
   
Observations 2,648 1,936 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 
Robust confidence intervals in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure A1. Sampling weight by community. Weighted versus unweighted 
samples 
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Figure 2A. Models with controls: Unionists  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3A. Models with controls: Nationalists 
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Table 2A.  A Multiplicative Model by community 
 
  
Ports of exit from Republic of Ireland   -.040 
 (-.093      .012) 
Location: Land Border -.147*** 
 (-.206   -.087) 
Unionists  
 
Location*Community 
 
Ports of exit from Republic of 
Ireland*Unionists  
Land Border *Unionists 
 
Checks: Electronic and Random Physical 
-.032 
(-.133    .067) 
 
 
.092** 
(.022    .162) 
.295*** 
(.218    .372) 
.110** 
(.035    .185) 
Checks: Random Physical at depots .108** 
 (.036    .181) 
Checks: Electronic Registration  .158*** 
 (.085    .232) 
Checks: No Checks  
 
Checks*Community 
 
Electronic and Random Physical*Unionists 
 
 Random Physical at depots*Unionists  
 
Electronic Registration*Unionists  
 
No checks*Unionists  
 
Control: Shared 
 
Control*Community  
 
Mixed teams UK-RoI*Unionists  
 
.195*** 
(*.121     .269) 
 
 
-.020 
(-.115    .073) 
-.025 
(-.119    .067) 
-.033 
(-.128   .061) 
-.107** 
          (-.204   -.010) 
.066** 
(.022    .110) 
 
 
-.036 
(-.094   .021) 
Maintenance: Users -.004 
 (-.063    .066) 
Maintenance: Ireland .002** 
 (-.159  -.032) 
Maintenance: Shared  .0747** 
 (.011    .137) 
 
Maintenance*Community 
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Users*Unionists  
 
RoI*Unionists  
 
Shared*Unionists  
 
Compensation: +5% 
-.004 
(-.091    .081) 
.002 
(-.082    .087) 
.003 
(-.079    .085) 
.047* 
 (-.007    .102) 
Compensation: +10%                      .109*** 
 (.050    .167) 
 
Compensation*Community  
 
5%*Unionists  
 
10%Unionists 
 
 
 
-.054 
(-.127    .018) 
-.054 
 
Constant 
(-.131    .023) 
.364*** 
(.288     .440) 
Observations 4,584 
R-squared 0.04 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A. Distribution of sample unweighted and weighted by 
community 
 
     
 
Unweighted 
number of 
respondents 
Percent of 
unweighted 
respondents 
Weighted 
number of 
respondents 
Percent of 
unweighted 
respondents 
Unionists  331 44 255 34 
Nationalist 242 33 194 26 
Neither  40 6 97 13 
Prefer not to say  146 19 212 28 
Total  759 100 759 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
